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A Long Time Coming
the seventeenth-century pueblo-spanish war
John L. Kessell

I

n his prize-winning book When Jesus Came, The Corn Mothers Went Away,
Marriage, Sexuality, and Power in New Mexico, 1500–1846 (1991), historian
Ramón A. Gutiérrez implied that New Mexico’s seventeenth-century Franciscan missionaries routinely abused their Pueblo Indian neophytes. “New
Mexico’s Indians,” Gutiérrez informed us, “were conquered and made mansos
[submissive] by a technique for which Fray Nicolás Hidalgo was renowned.
In 1638 the friar beat Pedro Acomilla of Taos Pueblo and grabbed him ‘by the
member and twisted it so much that it broke in half.’” If, for a fact, grabbing
Pueblo men’s penises had been standard procedure in the missions, I dare
say that the Pueblo-Spanish War, fought between 1680 and 1696, would have
been not such a long time coming.1
So why, through three entire generations—born, lived out, and buried
between the Spanish assault on Acoma in 1599 and the Pueblo siege of Santa
Fe in 1680—was redemption so long in coming? Was the colonial regime not
really so bad after all? Did the benefits of coexistence repeatedly undermine
the urge to revolt, even as smallpox, measles, and flu cruelly reduced the
Pueblo Indian population? Or were the Pueblos so deeply divided by traditional
grudges—and by the new promise of settling old scores through alliance with
Spaniards—that they simply could not rally themselves until 1680?
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A united pre-Hispanic Pueblo world never existed. Taken together, rock
and kiva art showing men in combat, projectile points embedded in human
bones, mass graves, burned communities, and defensive works testify that
this evolving island of town-dwellers was no native Eden before the advent
of rapacious Europeans. Nor was this a constant war zone. Warrior gods appeared early in Pueblo creation stories, and evidently hunt and war societies
formed to honor them and to feed and protect their people. Yet much of life
went on peaceably as various groups exchanged edible, material, and even
cultural resources. Cooperation and conflict ebbed and flowed at different
times and different places (just as they would during the colonial period).
Some late-thirteenth and fourteenth-century discord likely followed upon the
introduction of the new kachina ceremonial system borne up from Mesoamerica, as it certainly did when a new Christian ceremonial system arrived
two hundred years later.2
As Spaniards fastened their one true religion, common sovereignty, and
lingua franca upon New Mexico, they took advantage of Pueblo disunion,
enlisting Pueblo Indians to fight other Pueblo Indians. Soon enough, however,
as encircling nomadic peoples threatened New Mexico’s agricultural heartland, colonial authorities began to rely on mixed Pueblo Indian auxiliaries
who on campaign regularly outnumbered Spanish men-at-arms.
More than once, numerically superior Pueblo Indian fighters sought retaliation not against the kingdom’s nomadic enemies, but against the kingdom
itself. Once Spaniards discovered the plots, these conspiracies broke apart,
and the survivors took their grievances back underground. In 1680, however,
the colony’s recovery from environmental calamity and the emergence of
ironfisted Pueblo leaders, at long last, produced the desired outcome. To
stunned Spaniards, it was as if the familiar quotas of Pueblo auxiliaries set
out one day on campaign and came back the next an angry, ordered, overpowering mob.
****
Back in the mid-sixteenth century, Spaniards who first broke in on the
Pueblo world were already well practiced in using Indian peoples against
each other or as allies in common battles.3 Francisco Vázquez de Coronado’s
reverberating entrada of 1540—upwards of four hundred mounted Europeans and three times as many formidable Mexican Indian auxiliaries—upset
the prevailing Pueblo balance of power. Only the self-assured inhabitants
at Cicuique, or Pecos, the populous easternmost gateway between pueblos
and plains, sent a diplomatic mission to welcome the invaders. “Cicuye [Cicuique],” Coronado’s chronicler Pedro de Castañeda de Nájera recalled, “is a
pueblo of as many as five hundred fighting men. It is feared throughout that
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native groups in and around seventeenth-century new mexico
(Map drawn by Deborah Reade, Santa Fe, from John L. Kessell,
Pueblos, Spaniards, and the Kingdom of New Mexico, 2008, courtesy
University of Oklahoma Press)
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whole land. . . . The people of this pueblo boast that no one has been able to
subjugate them and that they subjugate [whichever] pueblos they want to.”4
En route to Cicuique, Coronado’s troop came upon “a fine, large pueblo,
destroyed during their wars.”5 Although relations quickly soured when Spaniards took Cicuique hostages, Coronado testified at his trial in Mexico City
that he had requested fighting men from Cicuique to help subdue Tiguex,
the province of Southern Tiwas in the vicinity of modern-day Albuquerque.
Cicuique’s headmen envisioned a colonial scheme of their own. Their community, cramped by a short, high-elevation growing season and constricted
farms, coveted Tiwa land in the lower-lying Rio Grande Valley. “They asked
the general,” Coronado’s testimony states, “to give them a pueblo there, which
they could settle with their people. And they said that they were coming to
help in the war.” But the Tiguex war ended, and the deal was never struck.6
Acoma, another seemingly aggressive pueblo, lacked the population of
Cicuique but sat atop an all but unassailable height at the western gateway
to the Rio Grande Valley. Its estimated two hundred warriors, characterized
by Castañeda as “marauders feared throughout the land and region,” could
strike at others and withdraw to the safety of their natural stronghold.7
Spaniards who came after Coronado also noted inter-Pueblo hostilities.
Antonio de Espejo’s brash, fast-moving outfit, numbering at most a few dozen,
was apparently the first expedition to use Pueblo Indian auxiliaries against
other Pueblos in 1583. A contingent of Zuni men armed with bows and arrows
volunteered to accompany the expedition to the Hopi pueblos. “Since about
thirty of these friendly natives had come with us from the province of Sumi
[Zuni], influenced by the Mexican Indian brothers, Andrés and Gaspar—two
of those left by Coronado—and these warriors showed a fine spirit, saying
they wanted to die wherever the Castillos died, we cut up pieces of red felt
and put a colored sign on each man’s head so that all could be recognized.”
Although this time the Hopis chose not to fight, no soldier who ever served in
a foreign people’s homeland would have failed to appreciate the red insignias
that distinguished friendly Zunis from potentially hostile Hopis.8
Fifteen years later, in the summer of 1598, Pueblo lookouts sighted a larger
column of Spaniards moving laboriously up the Rio Grande Valley. Bulky
animals strained at overloaded carts, children and women walked beside
or rode, while cursing men tried to keep livestock from straying. No mere
adventurers, these were migrants looking for a new home.
Most of the Southern Tiwas, whose elders recalled their brutal strife
with Coronado, simply vacated their pueblos and let these strangers pass
by. Developer Juan de Oñate’s many-hued colonists, six or seven hundred
in all, finally moved in amidst the Tewas at the pueblo of Ohkay Owingeh,
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some twenty-five miles north of later Santa Fe. Oñate called the place San
Juan Bautista. Hardly catching a breath, these new arrivals began to explore
in every direction looking for mines and performing unintelligible acts of
possession in Pueblo communities. Among the hollow benefits promised by
Oñate was the pax hispanica, an end to conflict in the Pueblo world.9
Pecos, assaulted eight years earlier by the renegade entrada of Gaspar
Castaño de Sosa, chose not to resist. Quizzical Pecos guides, hunters, and
observers surely accompanied Vicente de Zaldívar and his metal men in September 1598 as they rode out from Pecos onto the plains to corral buffalo. The
high and mighty Acomas, in contrast, did resist, throwing down the gauntlet
later in 1598 by killing Juan de Zaldívar, Oñate’s second-in-command and
brother of Vicente, along with a dozen of his men. Rather than withdraw the
vulnerable little colony—probably outnumbered at the time a hundred-toone in the Pueblo world—a firm-jawed Oñate directed Vicente de Zaldívar
and some seventy armed Spaniards to bring the Acomas to European justice.
Neither he, nor poet Gaspar Pérez de Villagrá, said anything about enlisting
Pueblo auxiliaries.10
Before the colony’s restoration by Diego de Vargas in the 1690s, hardly
anyone gave credit to allied Pueblo Indian fighting men. They might indeed
have accompanied Vicente de Zaldívar’s force, only to be ignored in formal
accounts of the battle, just as Coronado ignored his massive contingent of
Mexican Indians.11
At the very least, the vicious three-day fight at Acoma in 1599 must have
attracted more than a few Pueblo spectators. Testifying in the wake of the
Spaniards’ numbing victory, Pérez de Villagrá swore that the Acomas had
“wanted nothing more than to kill all the Spaniards in the army, and after
disposing of them to kill the Indians at the pueblos of Zía, Santo Domingo,
and San Juan Bautista, because they had failed to kill the Spaniards.”12
The presence of Pueblo auxiliaries at Acoma in January 1599, however,
would help to explain that improbable Spanish victory. And why should we
not suppose that Oñate’s Spaniards recruited Pueblo Indian allies for their
major expeditions eastward across the plains in 1601 and westward to the Gulf
of California in 1605, except that no Spaniard bothered to mention them?
A generation later, in 1634, Franciscan propagandist Alonso de Benavides
observed that the Tewa nation, among which Oñate’s colonists first settled, “is
very attached to the Spaniards, and when a war breaks out they are the first to
join and accompany them.” Benavides gave credit to one of his fellow friars
for establishing peace between Tewas and Jemez who had been previously,
according to Benavides’s excited account, “so hostile to the Christian Teoas
[Tewas], their neighbors, that one of their captains wore around his neck a
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string of ears of the Christians that he had killed, and he was eating them.”13
In February 1632, Zunis at the pueblo of Hawikuh had risen and murdered
Fray Francisco Letrado. Why would the Spanish punitive force that camped
at El Morro a month later “to avenge the death of Father Letrado” not have
included eager members of Tewa war societies?14
Pueblo men, traditionally good fighters, had their own reasons for joining
the Spaniards. Besides a furlough from their missions and a chance to travel,
campaigning alongside Spaniards allowed them to demonstrate their fighting
prowess, to exact revenge on their own enemies, and to share in the spoils of
war, including trophy scalps. The Spaniards’ motives hardly mattered. Military campaigns often turned to trading or slaving, and commercial ventures
sometimes broke into fights.
By enlisting Pueblo Indian auxiliaries against other Pueblo Indians, Spaniards kept pre-contact animosities alive or created new ones, thus preventing
the Pueblo world’s fighting men from joining forces against them. When,
however, Spanish governors resorted to gathering quotas of Pueblo males
from different communities and language groups to campaign together
against common enemies of the kingdom, a notable shift occurred. Alien
Pueblo war captains got to know each other and learned to fight shoulderto-shoulder. Recruitment fell to New Mexico’s half dozen alcaldes mayores,
or district officers, who parleyed with local Pueblo leaders for the desired
number of Pueblo fighters. Throughout the century, as the non-Christian,
non-town-dwelling peoples who ringed the Pueblos’ homeland—Apaches,
Navajos, and Utes—increasingly raided from horseback, Spaniards grew ever
more dependent on mixed Pueblo Indian allies.15
Corps of Native fighters could also be employed for personal gain. During
the brief and raucous administration of Gov. Bernardo López de Mendizábal,
New Mexico’s Franciscans raised a chorus of protests. Rather than defend
the kingdom from invading bands of heathens, López had turned its scant
military resources toward taking slaves for sale in the mines to the south. “For
this purpose of making captives,” the friars complained to superiors in Mexico
City, the governor in September 1659 “sent out an army of eight hundred
Christian Indians and forty Spaniards, though there was evident risk at the
time.”16 Even if the Franciscans exaggerated, a force of half that size would
have included Indian men from many different pueblos.
To coordinate such a complex, polyglot enterprise, Governor López must
have relied upon don Esteban Clemente, Native captain general of the
eastern frontier and the most prominent, thoroughly Hispanicized Pueblo
Indian in the kingdom. Distinguished by the honorific “don,” military rank,
and likely a written commission, cane of authority, and items of a Spanish
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officer’s uniform, Clemente by all odds rode a horse and wielded a sword
and arquebus.17 Yet most of the hundreds of Pueblo Indians on the expedition
of 1659 probably still walked—they could make twenty to thirty miles in a
day—and camped a little way off from the Spaniards. Protected in combat
by hide helmets, shirts, and shields, they relied for fire power on bows and
arrows, at times on slings and dart-like spears, and at close quarters on a variety
of clubs.18
The Spanish-speaking Clemente,
raised in the Tompiro missions of
the dry Salinas province a hundred
miles south of Santa Fe, knew several
Native languages and ran a trading
operation to Plains Apaches. Both
a business associate of the governor
and a favorite of the Franciscans,
Clemente got caught in the crossfire
between church and state. The missionaries condemned Pueblo Indian
kachina dances, while Governor
López, who considered these ceremonials nothing more than harmless folk rituals, encouraged their
revival. In 1660 the scandalized friars
potshuno, a tewa warrior of nambé
urged Clemente to dictate a state(Photograph by John K. Hillers, 1879, B.
ment condemning these “idolatrous”
M. Thomas Collection (MNM/DCA), no.
Pueblo rites. The kachinas, a dutiful
55217)
Clemente swore, “are evil.”19
Toward the end of the 1660s, the kachinas and whatever other powers
controlled the Pueblo universe seemed bent on revenge. Searing drought,
famine, disease, crop and supply failures, and ever more frequent Apache
raids scourged the kingdom. Hard-pressed governors appealed to the friars
to empty their mission larders in support of defensive campaigns. Gov. Juan
de Medrano y Mesía in the summer of 1669, hoping to lay waste the crops
of western Apaches and Navajos, vowed to launch from the Jémez pueblos
a force of fifty armed colonists and six hundred Christian Indians.20
To parry thrusts from eastern or Plains Apaches, Governor Medrano in
1670 appointed combat-scarred Capt. Juan Domínguez de Mendoza as field
commander of thirty Spanish men-at-arms and three hundred Pueblo auxiliaries. Designating Abó, home pueblo of Esteban Clemente, as the staging
area, the governor, not surprisingly, failed even to mention Clemente.21
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Whether he came gradually to treason or decided all of a sudden, Clemente conspired to overthrow the colonial regime and win back the kachinas.
The Spaniards’ brutal crackdown on his Piro neighbors late in the 1660s may
have contributed to the timing of Clemente’s attempted revolt, probably
around 1670.
The inevitably thick file of writs and declarations that described what
Clemente tried to do has gone missing. All we have today is a statement
made in 1681 by Diego López Sambrano, a tall, red-headed, and beady-eyed
Hispanic native of Santa Fe, hated by the Tewa Indians.22 According to López
Sambrano:
An Indian named Don Esteban Clemente, governor of all the Salinas
pueblos, whom the whole kingdom secretly obeyed, launched another
conspiracy which was general throughout the kingdom. He ordered
the Christian Indians to drive all the horse herds of every district into
the mountains, so as to leave the Spaniards afoot, and on Maundy
Thursday night, as was attempted during the administration of General
Concha [1649–53], to consume the entire body of Christians, sparing
not a single friar or Spaniard. Having exposed this treason, they hanged
said Indian, Don Esteban, and calmed the others, and when the
property of said Indian was seized there was found in his house a great
quantity of idols and whole pots of idolatrous powdered herbs, feathers,
and other disgusting things.23
Clemente had fallen short. His revolt was simply not a long enough time coming. The eleventh chapter of 2 Samuel in the Christian Old Testament begins,
“In the spring of the year, the time when kings go out to battle.”24 Both Clemente
and his unnamed predecessor plotted to engage the Spaniards in the spring
during Christian Holy Week. Would not mid-August, as all hands turned to the
ripening harvest, have been a more opportune season? In retrospect we might
also question an insurgency planned for the worst of times, when resources were
scarce and everyone went armed. Chances were, when conditions improved,
the Spanish ruling class would grow lax and less alert. After years of recruiting
Pueblo Indian auxiliaries to accompany Spaniards on campaign, Clemente
had apostatized to marshal the same Pueblo war captains against the colonial
regime. Why would they have trusted him? He was too widely known, his
connections too inclusive, and someone informed the Spaniards.
With the collapse of Clemente’s project and the abandonment of the Salinas and some Piro pueblos in the 1670s, energy in the Pueblo world shifted
notably from south and east to north and west, back to the heartland of the
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Tewas and their Tano (or Southern Tewa) allies, along with an unsubmissive
circle of outlying neighbors.
****
Pueblo-Spanish relations pivoted on the year 1675. Combative Juan Durán
de Miranda, ousted as governor in 1665 but reappointed in 1671, was finally
leaving. By one of his last acts, Miranda commissioned Juan Domínguez de
Mendoza to lead fifty-four Spanish men-at-arms and two hundred fifty Pueblo
auxiliaries against Faraón Apaches in central New Mexico.25 Whether they
chose to admit it, by this time Spanish and Pueblo defenders of the kingdom
had become codependent.
Not much of a record survives for the incoming governor Juan Francisco
Treviño, except for one fateful episode. In 1675 the mission supply caravan
returning to Mexico City carried not only former governor Miranda but also
Franciscan superior Francisco de Ayeta, en route to appeal at the viceroy’s
court for aid to the desperate colony. The rumble of the wagons had scarcely
faded when Treviño found himself in deep distress.
Again our best source is colonist López Sambrano, who stood center stage
in the developing drama. At San Ildefonso Pueblo, northwest of Santa Fe, an
Indian interpreter had accused Tewa “sorcerers” of bewitching long-suffering
Fray Andrés Durán. The new governor, frightened by locals into condoning
a witch hunt, dispatched his secretary Francisco Javier, along with López
Sambrano, Luis de Quintana, and other vigilante riders, to sweep through
Tewa country rounding up alleged sorcerers and confiscating ceremonial
paraphernalia. It did not end there.26
Father Ayeta recalled later the “repeated and severe punishments” Spanish
governors had inflicted on practitioners of Pueblo religion, in his words, most
“recently in the year ‘75 . . . by Don Juan Francisco Treviño, who hanged four
Indians in one day and had forty-three sentenced to whipping and being sold
into slavery as convicted and confessed idolaters, sorcerers, and homicides.”27
The preemptive hangings took place among three different Pueblo language
groups—Tewas, Keres, and Jemez—indicating a wider circle of unrest. Jailers
whipped the prisoners, but before they could be sold, Tewa fighting men
staged a daring coup.
López Sambrano picks up the story: “One morning more than seventy
Indians armed with macanas [clubs] and leather shields entered the house
where the said general [Treviño] was, filling two rooms.” Keen observers of
Spanish behavior, these Tewa men, like their fathers and grandfathers before
them, carried token gifts. But they were armed, and an unflinching resolve
shown in their eyes. They demanded that the governor pardon and release
the prisoners or they would kill him and attack Santa Fe with reinforcements
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waiting in the hills. Treviño caved. “Wait a while, children,” he supposedly
said, “I will give them to you and pardon them on condition that you forsake
idolatry and iniquity.”28
Bearing malice, the whipped and pardoned prisoner from Okhay Owingeh
whom Spaniards would later accuse of plotting a general Pueblo revolt, had a
notable advantage over Esteban Clemente—no Spaniard knew who he was.
None of his accusers ever found out his Christian baptismal name. And when
finally they did learn an approximation of his Tewa name, Po’pay, loosely
“Ripe Corn,” it was too late.
Meanwhile, in 1677, Father Ayeta reappeared with the convict-settlers
and supplies he had wrung from the viceroy, and ineffectual Antonio de
Otermín took over the governorship from a chastened Treviño. The Tewa
coup of 1675 seemed all but forgotten. Defensive codependence resumed.
The veteran Domínguez was back in the saddle in 1678, commanding fifty
armed colonists and four hundred Pueblo auxiliaries against Navajos west
of the Jemez Mountains.29
If Domínguez really did have four hundred Pueblo fighting men under
his command, and the average quota per pueblo was forty, or more likely
twenty, Pueblo males from ten or twenty different communities took part. In
addition to the usual core of Tewas and Tanos, the force must have incorporated Keresan and Jemez men, and probably Northern Tiwas from Taos and
Picuris, foreshadowing ominously the Rio Grande confederation of 1680.
Pedro Naranjo, a Keresan elder testifying in 1681, revealed how the
anonymous Po’pay had established his command post in a kiva at Taos, the
farthest pueblo north of Santa Fe and home to a fierce tradition of defiance.
Naranjo did not say when Po’pay moved north or how long he conspired
with conjured Native super-heroes.30 There is no way to know whether the
Pueblo war captains on Domínguez’s campaign of 1678 had any idea of plans
already underway for a massive revolt.
Po’pay, unlike Clemente, appears to have been more than a paramount
war captain, most likely a major religious leader of the Tewa summer people.31
Through skillful negotiations and, according to Naranjo and other witnesses,
a campaign of fear and coercion, he gained the temporary allegiance of
both spiritual and military leaders across a broad sector of the northern and
western Pueblo world. As the time drew near, Po’pay and his chief lieutenants—several of whom had dangerous kinship ties to Spaniards—would use
knotted yucca-fiber cords and smoke signals to spread the word.
****
The bloody Pueblo Revolt of August 1680—the first and swiftest act of
the Pueblo-Spanish War—caught the Spaniards notoriously off guard. That
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Saturday, 10 August, feast day of San Lorenzo, veteran Capt. Francisco de
Anaya Almazán and eight herders had drawn routine duty guarding horses
near the Tewa pueblo of Santa Clara. Attacked without warning, two of the
herders fell dead as Anaya and the others spurred hell-bent for Santa Fe. After a
terrifying, ten-day Pueblo siege of their capital, Spanish survivors broke out, and
their besiegers let them go. Six weeks later, just northwest of El Paso, Governor
Otermín’s aides counted 1,946 refugees. Upriver, some four hundred of their
neighbors lay dead. The Pueblos had taken back their world.32
None of the twenty-one friars slain in their missions had died farther
south than San Marcos in the Galisteo Basin or Santo Domingo on the Rio
Grande.33 The epicenter of revolt was in the north (as it would be again in
1696, 1805, 1837, and 1847). The Southern Tiwas, Piros, and Tompiros had
either abandoned their pueblos earlier or gone south with the Spaniards. Not
surprisingly, when Otermín mounted an abortive reconquista in the winter of
1681, he had with him not only twenty-one Manso Indian auxiliaries from El
Paso, but also fifty-six Piros, thirty-one Southern Tiwas, and nine renegades
from Jemez.34
The decade-long second act of the Pueblo-Spanish War played itself out
between 1681 and 1691, severely punishing both sets of widely separated former
combatants. Exiled Spaniards and contingent Pueblo Indians endured misery
in refugee camps around El Paso. And, up the Rio Grande, independent
Pueblo Indians, rid of their colonial overlords for the time being, fell back
into disunion.
Keresan war captain Bartolomé de Ojeda watched it happen. Raised in
the missions, Ojeda, like Clemente, spoke and wrote Spanish. Evidently he
had taken an active part in the Pueblo Revolt. Later, when Gov. Domingo
Jironza and southern Pueblo fighters marched upriver to sack Zia in 1689,
Ojeda fought them like a wounded mountain lion. Captured and taken to
El Paso, Ojeda experienced a change of heart and quit the revolt.
Testifying before Governor Jironza, the rehabilitated Ojeda not only
related in graphic detail how Jemez, Acomas, Zunis, and Hopis had put
to death seven Franciscans in 1680, but also the subsequent discord he had
observed among the Pueblos. The Keres of Zia, Santa Ana, San Felipe, and
Cochiti, along with the Jemez, Taos, and Pecos Pueblos, warred incessantly
against the Tewas and Picuris. The Acomas had split; one faction abandoning their stronghold to join other disenchanted Keres at Laguna. Zunis and
Hopis were also at war. Apaches traded with some pueblos and committed
hostilities against others, while Utes raided wherever they could.35
Whether Ojeda had the alliances and misalliances straight, his testimony
implied severe disharmony in the Pueblo world. Moreover, endemic Pueblo
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factionalism tore apart certain Pueblo communities, notably Acoma and
Pecos. Taken together, such disintegration invited the Pueblo-Spanish War’s
third and final act: Spanish restoration of the kingdom in the 1690s.
Capable, lisping, forty-seven-year-old Diego José de Vargas Zapata Luján
Ponce de León y Contreras acceded to the governorship of New Mexico in
exile at El Paso in February 1691. Vargas would use Pueblo Indian auxiliaries
against other Pueblos more often and more effectively than any governor
before or after him. A significant number of Pueblo leaders now recognized
that rule by one of their own offered less security and fewer benefits than
the colonial regime. To rally such “pro-Spanish” headmen, Vargas relied on
Ojeda, who became the governor’s chief advance man, recruiter, and adviser
on Indian affairs. Other Pueblo leaders, who vowed to die rather than allow
the Spaniards’ return, led their people to mesa-top fortifications and dared
Vargas to come get them.
Vargas’s strategy of restraint during his ritual reconquest in 1692 won the
Spanish governor steadfast Pueblo allies in future battles. He had refused to
loot abandoned Pecos Pueblo. Hence, in the last days of 1693, as Spaniards
stormed the many-tiered citadel Tewas and Tanos had built right over the
top of the old governor’s palace, one hundred and forty Pecos fighters joined
Vargas’s command. Indian-occupied Santa Fe fell. Precarious as their hold
proved to be, the Spaniards were back.36
In 1694, Vargas, relying consistently on more Pueblo Indian auxiliaries than
Spanish men-at-arms, assaulted and eventually carried the three high places
fortified by breakaway Keres warriors from Santo Domingo and Cochiti on
the Mesa of la Cieneguilla de Cochiti, defiant Jemez on San Diego Mesa,
and Tewas and Tanos atop Black Mesa.37 The Keres had splintered, yet Ojeda
kept the majority of his kin from Zia, Santa Ana, and San Felipe solidly in
the Spanish camp.
We may never sort out the hatreds and loyalties that drove Vargas’s Pueblo
Indian allies. Were their ambivalent passions born during the Pueblo-Spanish
War or summoned from obscure memories that long antedated that conflict?
What possessed Ojeda’s Keresan auxiliaries to battle other Keres fortified
on Cieneguilla Mesa? When he led these same Keresan fighters up San
Diego Mesa against Jemez defenders, did their motivation harken back to
the fourteenth century when belligerent ancestors of these Jemez pushed
roughly into Keresan territory? Whatever impelled them, Pueblo Indians
had fought other Pueblo Indians during the Spanish conquest just as they
did again during the Spanish restoration.
When open revolt flared once more in June 1696, ending the lives of
five more Franciscans and some twenty Spanish colonists, Vargas scrapped
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diplomacy and campaigned hard, always with Pecos and other Pueblo fighting
men at his side.38 After 1696 Pueblo warriors never again fought against other
Pueblos on a large scale. By year’s end, the Pueblo-Spanish War was over.
Instinctively, the kingdom’s old defensive codependence between
Pueblos and Spaniards fell back into place.39 Vargas, in fact (imprisoned by
his successor in Santa Fe, acquitted in Mexico City, and reappointed to the
governorship of New Mexico in 1703), led a campaign against Faraón Apaches
in the early spring of 1704. His forty-some presidial soldiers and armed colonists
were outnumbered typically three-to-one by Pueblo Indian auxiliaries from
at least a dozen villages, but most from Pecos. Abruptly, operations ceased.
Don Diego de Vargas, recolonizer and twice governor of New Mexico, had
fallen ill evidently with dysentery, and died a few days later.40
****
By the time Fray Nicolás Hidalgo allegedly grabbed Pedro Acomilla’s
penis in 1638, Spaniards had occupied New Mexico for forty years. Another
forty-two years passed before the revolt of 1680. During those eighty-two
years, the Pueblo Indians’ population shriveled by two-thirds, from some sixty
thousand to twenty thousand. Similarly, the number of Pueblo communities
fell from around ninety to fewer than forty.41 Did Po’pay feel the urgency to
act knowing that Pueblo war societies had shrunk notably since the days of
his father, further still since those of his grandfather? Like sand in an hour
glass, the Pueblos’ numerical superiority was slipping away.
And all the while, time ripened. Experiences were stored up. Some Pueblo
Indians resisted, failed, and died; Spanish governors gouged the colony and
left; colonists’ children played with Pueblo children. On campaign after
campaign, Pueblo Indian war captains, serving alongside Spaniards, grew in
confidence and in acceptance of each other. Then, in the 1660s and 1670s
as the forces of nature bore down on the kingdom, certain Franciscans saw
the devil leering from every shadow, and more and more Pueblo Indians
turned again to the kachinas. Finally, the sons of August showed the way. It
may be that the stunning success of the Pueblo Revolt in 1680 owed most to
the singular and undeniable fact that it was such a long time coming.
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